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ABSTRACT Encryption technologies have become one of the most prevalent solutions to safeguard data
confidentiality in may real-world applications, e.g., cloud-based data storage systems. Encryption outputting
a relatively “static" format of encrypted data, however, may hinder further data operations, for example,
encrypted data may need to be “transformed" into other formats for either computation or other purposes. In
order to enable an encryption to be used in another device equipped with a different encryption mechanism,
the concept of encryption switching is first proposed in CRYPTO 2016 for conversion particularly between
Paillier and ElGamal encryptions. This paper considers the conversion between conventional identity-based
and attribute-based encryptions and further proposes a concrete construction via the technique of proxy re-
encryption. The construction is proved to be CPA secure in the standard model under q-decisional parallel
bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent assumption. The performance comparisons highlight that our bridging
mechanism reduces computation and communication cost on client side, especially when the data of client
is encrypted and outsourced to remote cloud. The computational costs w.r.t. re-encryption (on server side)
and decryption (on client side) are acceptable in practice.
INDEX TERMS Data Security, Encryption Switching, Identity-Based Encryption, Attribute-Based En-
cryption, CPA Security, Standard Model
I. INTRODUCTION
An interesting and useful primitive of public key cryptog-
raphy, which is called encryption switching protocol (ESP),
has been introduced in CRYPTO 2016 by Couteau et al. [1].
The basic idea behind ESP is to build a “bridge" between an
ElGamal-like ciphertext and a Paillier encryption [2] in such
a way that the two different encryptions can transfer from one
to the other. For instance, give an encryption of Paillier, ESP
can be used to convert the ciphertext to ElGamal-like encryp-
tion under the same plaintext and furthermore, it cannot leak
the underlying plaintext in encryption conversion phase. The
initial motivation of the design of ESP is to bring convenience
and scalability in the transformation between homomorphic
computations (+ and ×), so that even a garbled circuit with
only + (resp. ×) gates is able to take ElGamal-like (resp.
Paillier) encryption as input.
Inspired by the seminal notion, this paper explores the
concept of ESP into more general context of public key en-
cryption (PKE). As the advanced versions of PKE, identity-
based encryption (IBE) [3] and attribute-based encryption
(ABE) [4] have been introduced in the literature to enhance
fine-grained data sharing by allowing data encryptor to en-
crypt data under the “fuzzy" information of data receiver.
Furthermore, ABE also supports one-to-many data sharing
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mode in the sense that data owner only needs to generate
an encryption intended for a group of users specified by
some descriptions, so that the users can leverage respective
decryption keys to reveal the underlying plaintext. Both of
the cryptographic primitives can be implemented in many
real-world applications, such as Voltage1, Secure Zones [5]
and Andraben [6].
Motivation. Suppose a local tax authority may send an
email to contact a tax payer, say Alice, to ask for necessary
documents (e.g. bank details, income) to see if Alice commits
some frauds in tax report. If there is a sender address in the
email, Alice may encrypt an audit log of personal online
bank transactions under the address for the authority. Upon
the arrival of the encrypted message, the gateway of the tax
authority may recognize it in order to send the encryption
to the most appropriate officials. To do so, the gateway has
to decrypt the ciphertext and further re-encrypt it under, say
the email address of Bob (who is the official at tax auditing
department). If Alice cannot see the address of sender in
the email (note this is quite common in practice, known
as “No-Reply" email), she may encrypt the file under the
descriptions of the authority, for example, (“Tax Authority"
AND “London Area" AND (“Auditing Dept." OR “Others")),
and further upload the encryption to the authority online. The
gateway of the tax authority may do nothing but broadcast
the encryption within the inside network. To shorten the
response time of handling each auditing case, the gateway
may reform the ciphertext intended for specified officials by
decrypting the message and re-encrypting under the officials’
email addresses. However, both of the above approaches leak
sensitive personal information to the gateway.
We may also consider a scenario where a communication
channel can only support a special type of encrypted mes-
sage, say IBE, due to the control of communication band-
width. However, an ABE ciphertext requests to go through
the channel to reach another network domain. Without a
secure ciphertext convertor, the gateway of the channel has
to decrypt the message to fulfil the transformation of encryp-
tion. How to allow one to securely convert the ciphertexts
without gaining access to the underlying plaintext that moti-
vates this work.
The conversion between encryptions with different do-
mains may bring convenience in data analysis and communi-
cation. For instance, in the context of big data aggregation, a
data collector may receive various formats of data from many
sources. It is challenging for the collector to aggregate the
data if they are encrypted in different domains. A naive way
of data aggregation here is first to request all the data sources
to provide decryption keys and further to fulfil expensive
decryption. But this method requires share of secret keys that
yields potential data security breach to the data sources. How
to allow one to securely share data without sharing secret key
that also motivates our work.
1https://www.voltage.com/technology/data-encryption/identity-based-
encryption/
Under the umbrella of EPS, this paper considers the con-
version between IBE and ABE.
Difficulty. It is challenging to achieve our goal - designing
an encryption switching scheme to bridge IBE and ABE via
proxy re-encryption (PRE) technique. In the literature, only
Mizuno and Doi [7] have proposed an ABE → IBE type
PRE construction that is able to convert a ciphertext in the
format of ABE to an IBE encryption. The scheme, however,
cannot achieve the conversion for the other way round, i.e.
converting an IBE ciphertext to an ABE encryption. Be-
sides, [7] only supports AND gates on positive and negative
attributes w.r.t. ABE encryption, which is with low expres-
siveness. The construction proposed in this paper will not be
limited to the above issues. But the main difficulty depends
on how to construct re-encryption key to (i) enable bilateral
conversion and (ii) minimize the effect expressiveness (in
terms of ABE). In order to construct a re-encryption key we
usually need to input the secret/private key of a delegator (i.e.
original data owner) and the public key information (or ID,
attributes) of a delegatee (i.e. the data receiver after conver-
sion). We here give the re-encryption key construction in [7]
as an example whereby gα1 and gat are parts of the private
key of delegator and meanwhile ID is the public identity of
delegatee. However, the part gα1gat(gIDh)w is the hindrance
to prevent the conversion from IBE to ABE. To bypass this
hindrance, in our construction, we design a re-encryption
key from the private key of delegator and a partial private
key of delegatee. The re-encryption key actually contains the
delegator’s private key and an IBE ciphertext. When being
used to convert an ABE ciphertext to an IBE one, the re-
encryption algorithm runs the ABE decryption and further
outputs the decryption results which is an IBE ciphertext.
In this case, we must guarantee that, given a re-encryption
key, proxy cannot obtain any information of the underling
plaintext, even if it colludes with the corresponding delegatee
(who is without knowledge of the delegator’s private key). To
achieve the guarantee, we randomize the private keys of both
delegator and delegatee. Besides, we require that the hard
assumptions of the underlying ABE and IBE should be the
same or at least, have an inclusive relationship.
Identity-Based Encryption. Identity-based cryptography is
a general extension of public-key cryptography where the
public key of a user can be any arbitrary string uniquely
representing the identity of the user (e.g. name or email ad-
dress). In 1984, Shamir first proposed the concept of IBE [3].
Till 2001, the first construction of IBE was constructed by
Boneh and Franklin [8] by using Weil pairing. However, the
security proof is based on the random oracle model. In 2004,
Boneh and Boyen presented an IBE scheme with IND-ID-
CPA security in the standard model [9], and later Waters [10]
proposed a more efficient IBE scheme. Since its introduction,
IBE has been explored to support various features, e.g.,
anonymous IBE [11], [12], hierarchical IBE [13], identity-
based broadcast encryption [14] and revocable IBE [15].
Attribute-Based Encryption. ABE is an extension of IBE.
It allows private key and ciphertext to be labeled with de-
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scriptions, so that a decryption is valid if and only if the
description of a decryption key matches that of a ciphertext.
It has been widely employed in fine-grained data access
control. There are two important variants of ABE, one is key-
policy ABE (KP-ABE) [16] relating access control policy to
decryption key, and the other is ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-
ABE) [17], [18] associating ciphertext with access control
policy. Since its introduction, ABE has been extended to
support various features, e.g., large universe ABE [19], [20],
traceable ABE [21], [22] and outsourced ABE [23], [24].
Proxy re-encryption. Blaze et al. [25] introduced the notion
of PRE in the context of PKE. In a PRE system, a delegator,
say Alice, can request a semi-trusted proxy to transform a
ciphertext under her public key to another ciphertext under
the public key of a delegatee, say Bob, without leaking
the underlying information of the plaintext to the proxy.
Some variants of traditional PRE have been proposed in the
literature (e.g. [26]–[28]). In 2007, Green and Ateniese [29]
explored PRE in the context of IBE and further introduced
the notion of the identity-based PRE (IBPRE). To imple-
ment PRE in the attribute-based cryptographic setting, Liang
et al. [30] defined CP-ABPRE, and proposed a concrete
construction on top of [31]. Following the seminal work,
ABPRE have been proposed to achieve better security and
more expressiveness in data sharing [32].
However, all the aforementioned schemes cannot support
encryption switching. A hybrid proxy PRE was first proposed
by Matsuo [33] in 2007 to enable a PKE ciphertext to be
converted to an IBE one. Later, Mizuno et al. [7] proposed
a PRE conversion from ABE to IBE while maintaining the
confidentiality of plaintext. Rencently, Couteau, Peters and
Pointcheval [1] introduce an encryption switching between
Paillier and ElGamal based on homomorphic encryption. We
compare our construction with [1], [7], [9], [18], [33] in terms
of functionality, security and feature in Table 1. We state that
the details of efficiency analysis will be given in Section 5.
We state that our scheme is the first of its type to achieve
bidirectional conversion between ABE and IBE with CPA
security in the standard model.
A. ORGANIZATION
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we briefly review complexity assumption, definitions and
security notion used in this paper. In Section 3 we present
the construction. In Section 4, we give the security proof. In
Section 5, we compare our work with other related works in
terms of efficiency. In Section 6, we present the conclusion.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. BILINEAR GROUPS AND COMPLEXITY
ASSUMPTION
Two multiplicative cyclic groupsG andGT whose orders are
prime p and a bilinear map e : G × G → GT has following
three properties:
• Bilinearity: e(ga, hb) = e(g, h)ab for all g, h ∈ G and
a, b ∈ Zp.
• Non-degeneracy: There exist g, h ∈ G such that
e(g, h) 6= 1G.
• Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to
compute e(g, h) for all g, h ∈ G.
Decisional Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent As-
sumption [18]. Given a group G of prime order p, let
a, s, b1, · · · , bq ∈R Zp and g be a generator of G. If an
algorithm is given −→y = g, gs, ga, · · · , gaq , , gaq+2 , · · · , ga2q
∀1 ≤ j ≤ q gs·bj , ga/bj , · · · , gaq/bj , , gaq+2/bj , · · · , ga2q/bj
∀1 ≤ j, k ≤ q, k 6= j ga·s·bk/bj , · · · , gaq·s·bk/bj
It is hard to distinguish e(g, g)a
q+1s ∈ GT from a random
element in GT .
The advantage ε of an adversary A to solve decisional q-
parallel BDHE if
|Pr[A(−→y , T = e(g, g)aq+1s) = 0]−Pr[A(−→y , T = R) = 0]| ≥ ε
B. DEFINITION OF ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION
Definition 1. An attribute-based encryption (ABE) usually
consists of four algorithms.
ABE.Setup(λ, U ): intake a security parameter λ and descrip-
tion universe, output the public parameters PK and a master
key MSK. We assume that PK is implicitly seen as input
for the following algorithms.
ABE.KeyGen(MSK,A): intake the master key MSK and
a description A, output a private key SK.
ABE.Encrypt(M,B): intake a message M, and a descrip-
tion B, output a ciphertext CT .
ABE.Decrypt(CT, SK): intake a ciphertext CT which con-
tains a description A, and a private key SK corresponding to
another description B. If Bmatches A the algorithm decrypts
the ciphertext and returns a messageM; otherwise, return⊥.
While A is a set of attributes over U and B is an access
policy, the definition is for KP-ABE; if the case is the other
way round, that is for CP-ABE.
C. DEFINITION OF IDENTITY-BASED ENCRYPTION
Definition 2. Following Definition 1, if we set A = B as an
identity of a system user, we have the definition for IBE.
D. DEFINITION OF ENCRYPTION SWITCHING
We here define a general ciphertext conversion framework
between ABE and IBE.
Definition 3. Following Definition 1 and 2, we have the
definition of encryption switching (ES):
ES.Setup(λ,U ): (ABE.PK,ABE.MSK)←ABE.Setup(λ,
U ) and (IBE.PK, IBE.MSK) ← IBE.Setup(λ, U).
Set PK = (ABE.PK, IBE.PK) and MSK =
(ABE.MSK, IBE.MSK). We note that λ is the same
security parameter and the ABE.PK, IBE.PK could be
held by two distinct trusted parties, respectively.
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TABLE 1. Comparison with Related Works
Scheme Type Complexity Assumption Security Standard
Model
[9] IBE decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) CPA
√
[18] ABE decisional q-parallel BDHE CPA
√
[33] PKE→IBE DBDH CPA √
[7] ABE→IBE DBDH CPA √
[1] Paillier↔ElGammal decisional composite residuosity, CPA √
decisional Diffie-Hellman, quadratic residuosity assumptions
√
Ours IBE↔ABE decisional q-parallel BDHE CPA √
ES.KeyGen(MSK,A): SKA ← δ.KeyGen(MSK,A),
where δ ∈ {ABE, IBE} and A ∈ {an attribute set,
anaccess policy, an identity}.
ES.ReKeyGen(A,B, SKA, SKB): intake the descriptions A,
B and private keys SKA, SKB, output a re-encryption key
RKA→B, where A and B are from distinct encryption mech-
anisms, e.g., A ∈ {an attribute set, an access policy} and
B is an identity.
ES.Encrypt(M,A): CTA ← δ.Encryption(M,A). We
assume that ABE and IBE share the same message domain
in the definition.
ES.ReEncrypt(CTA, RKA→B): intake a ciphertext CTA un-
der the description A and a re-encryption key RKA→B,
output a re-encrypted ciphertext CTB.
ES.Decrypt(CT, SK):M/ ⊥← δ.Decrypt(CT, SK).
Note that we assume the above conversion definition be-
tween ABE and IBE should share the same message domain
M (so that the conversion can be executed smoothly).
E. SECURITY MODEL OF ENCRYPTION SWITCHING
ABE↔IBE IN GAME-BASED FRAMEWORK
The selectively chosen plaintext security against ABE→IBE
type ES is defined as the following game between an attacker
A and a challenger C. The game describes the security of
underlying ABE and IBE scheme even if A achieves re-
encryption keys which can transform the ciphertext of ABE
to the one of IBE.
Init. A chooses a target access structure A∗ and a target IBE
identity ID∗, and sends them to C.
Setup. C runs SetupA(1κ) and SetupI(1κ), and returns
ABE public parameters and IBE public parameters to the A.
Phase 1. A is allowed to adaptively issue ABE private
key queries, IBE private key queries and re-encryption key
queries as follows:
• ExtractA(S) :A can adaptively and repeatedly request
an ABE private key for a set S where S 6|= A∗.
• ExtractI(ID, params): A can adaptively and repeat-
edly issue an IBE private key corresponding to an iden-
tity ID of his choice.
• ExtractA→I(S, ID): A can adaptively and repeatedly
request re-encryption key which can transform ABE
ciphertexts encrypted for set S to IBE ciphertexts corre-
sponding to an identity ID. (It is only with the security
of [ABE-IBE] type proxy re-encryption scheme)
Challenge. A submits two equal length messages M0 and
M1 and selects which scheme to attack (ABE or IBE). C
randomly chooses β ∈ {0, 1} and returns the encrypted result
of Mβ encrypted by the selected scheme.
Phase 2. Same as Phase 1.
Guess. A submits a guess β′ ∈ {0, 1}. If β′ = β, A wins.
During Phase 1 and 2,A is restricted the following queries:
• ExtractA(S), where S |= A∗.
• ExtractI(ID∗).
• ExtractA→I(S∗, ID) and ExtractI(ID, param)
queries, where S |= A∗ and ID is an arbitrary IBE
user’s identity.
Remark. The selectively chosen plaintext security against
IBE→ABE type ES is similar to the above security game
except the queries of re-encryption keyExtractI→A(ID, S)
where the re-encryption key transforms IBE under an identity
ID to ABE under a description S.
Definition 4. We define A’s advantage in the above game
as AdvA(1κ) = 2Pr[β′ = β] − 1. We state that an
ABE→IBE (resp. IBE→ABE) type ES is indistinguishable
under selectively chosen-plaintext attacks, if for any proba-
bilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A, the advantage
in the security game is negligible.
III. CONSTRUCTIONS
A. BUILDING BLOCKS REVIEW
Our ES between ABE and IBE is built on top of Waters-ABE
scheme [18] and the first construction of BB-IBE [9]. We are
going to review them as follows.
Waters-ABE Construction. Waters-ABE consists of the
following four algorithms [18].
Setup(λ,U ). Let U be the maximum number of system
attributes. LetG,GT be a bilinear group of prime order p. Let
e : G × G → GT . Then it chooses a generator g as well as
random group elements h1, · · · , hU ∈ G that are associated
with the U attributes in the system. In addition, it chooses
random exponents α1, a ∈ Zp. The public key is
PK1 = g, e(g, g)
α1 , ga, h1, · · · , hU .
The master private key is MSK1 = gα1 .
Encrypt(PK1,M, (M,ρ)). It takes as input the public pa-
rameters PK1, a message M as well as an LSSS access
structure (M,ρ), where M be an ` × n matrix and ρ as-
sociates rows of M to attributes. It first chooses a vector
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~v=(s, y2, · · · , yn) ∈R Znp . These values will be used to share
the encryption exponent s. For i = 1 to `, it calculates
λi = ~v ·Mi, where Mi is the vector corresponding to the ith
row of M . Then it chooses r1, · · · , r` ∈R Zp and computes
the ciphertext as follows:
C =M · e(g, g)α1s,
C ′ = gs, {Ci = gaλih−riρ(i), Di = gri}i∈{1,··· ,`}
The ciphertext is CTS = (C,C ′, {Ci, Di}ρ(i)∈M ) along
with a description of (M,ρ).
KeyGen(MSK1, S). It takes as input the master private key
MSK1 and a set S of attributes. It chooses t ∈R Zp and
creates the private key SKS = (K,L, {Kx}x∈S) as
K = gα1gat, L = gt, ∀x ∈ S : Kx = htx
Decrypt(CT, SKS). It takes as input a ciphertext CT for
a linear access structure (M,ρ) and a private key SKS .
Suppose that S satisfies the access structure and let I ⊂
{1, 2, · · · , `} be defined as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. Then, let
{wi ∈ Zp}i∈I be a set of constants such that if {λi} are valid
shares of any secret s according to M , then
∑
i∈I wiλi = s.
It computes
M = C ·
∏
i∈I
(
e(Ci, L)e(Di,Kρ(i))
)wi
e(C ′,K)
=
M · e(g, g)α1s ·∏i∈I e(g, g)aλiwit
e(g, g)α1se(g, g)ast
BB-IBE. We review BB-IBE [9] construction as follows.
Setup(λ). Let G,GT be a bilinear group of prime order p,
and e : G × G → GT be the bilinear map. Given a security
parameter λ as input, the algorithm selects a generator g0 ∈R
G and h, g2 ∈R G. It picks α2 ∈R Zp and sets g1 = gα20 . The
public parameters are PK2 = (g0, g1, g2, h) and the master
private key is MSK2 = α2.
Encrypt(ID, PK2,M). Given an identity ID, public pa-
rameter PK2 and plaintextM ∈ GT as input, the algorithm
selects w ∈R Zp and outputs an IBE ciphertext CTID.
CTID = (C1, C2, C3) = (g
w
0 , (g
ID
1 h)
w,Me(g1, g2)w)
KeyGen(MSK2, PK2, ID). Given master private key
MSK2, public parameters PK2 and an identity ID as input,
the algorithm picks u ∈R Zp and outputs an IBE private key
as
SKID = (SK
1
ID, SK
2
ID) = (g
α2
2 (g
ID
1 h)
u, gu0 ).
Decrypt(SKID, CTID). Given an IBE private key SKID
and an IBE ciphertext CTID as input, the algorithm outputs
a plaintextM.
M = C3 · e(SK
2
ID, C2)
e(SK1ID, C1)
B. CONSTRUCTION: ABE→IBE TYPE ES
Based on the above ABE and IBE schemes, we de-
sign an ES via PRE technique which converts the en-
cryption of ABE to that of IBE scheme. We define
that ES.Setup =[Setup(λ, U ), Setup(λ)], ES.KeyGen
= [KeyGen(MSK1, S), KeyGen(MSK2, PK2, ID)], and
ES.Encrypt = [Encrypt(PK1, M, (M,ρ)), Encrypt(ID,
PK2, M)]. The main technique we introduce here is to
build a plug-in to convert two types of encryption, so that
we only focus on the algorithms related to the conversion,
namely ES.ReKenGen, ES.ReEncrypt and ES.Decrypt. For
the setup, key generation and encryption, one may use re-
spective algorithm depending on which encryption domain
he/she is currently in, for example, one may use the algorithm
Encrypt(ID, PK2, M) to encrypt data if he/she is in the
context of IBE.
ES.ReKenGenA→I (PK1, PK2, S, ID, SKS , SK2ID): Giv-
en the ABE and IBE public parameter PK1 and PK2,
attribute set S and a delegator B’s ABE private key SKS ,
a delegatee A’s IBE identity ID and its 2nd component
of private key SK2ID as input, the algorithm outputs a re-
encryption keyRKA→I = (Ra, Rb, Rc, Rd, rk1, {rkx}x∈S)
as follows:
• Client A chooses u′ ∈R Zp and computes SK2ID ′ =
SK2ID · gu
′
0 = g
u′′
0 , where u + u
′ = u′′. Then client A
returns SK2ID
′ to client B and keeps secret u′ which is
needed in the decryption algorithm.
• Client B selects t′ ∈R Zp and sets
Ra = K · gat′ · SK2ID ′ = gα1gat
′′
gu
′′
0 .
Client B selects τ ∈R Zp and sets
Rb = g
τ
0 , Rc = (g
ID
1 h)
τ , Rd = e(g1, g2)
τ .
Client B computes rk1 = L · gt′ = gt′′ .
For each attribute x ∈ S: rkx = Kx · ht′x = ht
′′
x , where
t+ t′ = t′′.
ES.ReEncryptA→I (RKA→I , CTS): Given attribute set S,
identity ID, a re-encryption key RKA→I and an ABE
ciphertext CTS = (C,C ′, {Ci, Di}ρ(i)∈M ) along with a
description of (M ,ρ) as input, output an IBE ciphertext
CTID = (C1, C2, C3) as follows:
Suppose S satisfies the access structure (M,ρ) and let I ⊂
{1, 2, · · · , `} be defined as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. Then, let
{wi ∈ Zp}i∈I be a set of constants such that if {λi} are valid
shares of any secret s according to M , then
∑
i∈I
wiλi = s.
Compute C ′i = e(Ci, rk1)e(rki, Di) = e(g, g)
aλit
′′
.
Select y ∈R Zp and compute:
C1 = R
y
b = g
τy
0
C2 = R
y
c · C ′ = (gID1 h)τy · gs
C3 =
C ·Ryd ·
∏
i∈I C
′
i
wi
e(C ′, Ra)
=M · e(g1, g2)
τy
e(gs, gu
′′
0 )
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ES.Decrypt(PK2, CTID, SKID): Given IBE public param-
eters PK2, ciphertext CTID and private key SKID of iden-
tity ID, client A uses u′ and computes
M = C3 · e(SK
2
ID · gu
′
0 , C2)
e
(
SK1ID · (gID1 h)u′ , C1
)
=
M · e(g1, g2)τye(gu′′0 , (gID1 h)τy · gs)
e(gs, gu
′′
0 )e
(
gα2 (g
ID
1 h)
u(gID1 h)
u′ , gτy0
)
C. IBE→ABE TYPE ES
We further design IBE→ABE Type ES which converts ci-
phertexts of IBE to ABE format as follows. Similarly, we
focus on the algorithms supporting ciphertext conversion.
ES.ReKenGenI→A(PK1, PK2, S, ID, SKID, SKS): Giv-
en ABE and IBE public parameter PK1 and PK2, attribute
set S and a delegator B’s ABE private key SKS , a dele-
gatee’s IBE identity ID and an IBE user A’s private key
SKID as input, output a re-encryption key RKI→A =
(Ra, Rb, {Rci}ρ(i)∈M ′ , Rd, rk1, rk2) as follows:
• Client B chooses t′ ∈R Zp and computes K ′ = K ·
gat
′
= gα1gat
′′
, where t + t′ = t′′. Client B sends K ′
to client A and keeps secret t′ which is needed in the
decryption algorithm.
• Client A selects u′ ∈R Zp and sets
Ra = SK
1
ID · (gID1 h)u
′ ·K ′ = gα22 (gID1 h)u
′′
gα1gat
′′
Client A selects τ ∈R Zp and sets Rb = gτ .
Let M ′ be an ` × n matrix. The algorithm chooses a
random vector ~v′ = (τ, y′2, · · · , y′n) ∈ Znp , which will
be used to share the encryption exponent τ .
For i = 1 to `, it calculates λ′i = ~v′ ·M ′i , whereM ′i is the
vector corresponding to the ith row of M ′. In addition,
it chooses random r′i ∈ Zp and computes
Rci = {Ci = gaλ′ih−r
′
i
ρ(i), Di = g
r′i}, Rd = e(g, g)α1τ
Client A chooses δ ∈ Zp and computes
rk1 = sk
2
ID · gu
′
0 · gδ0 = gu
′′+δ
0 , rk2 = (g
ID
1 h)
δ
ES.ReEncryptI→A(RKI→A, CTID): Given a re-encryption
key RKI→A = (Ra,, Rb, {Rci}ρ(i)∈M ′ , Rd, rk1, rk2}) and
an IBE ciphertext CTID = (C1, C2, C3) as input, output
an ABE ciphertext CTS = ({C1i}ρ(i)∈M ′ , C2, C3, C4) as
follows:
C =
e (C2, rk1)
e (C1, rk2)
=
e
(
(gID1 h)
w, gu
′′+δ
0
)
e
(
gw0 , (g
ID
1 h)
δ
) = e((gID1 h)w, gu′′0 )
Chooses y ∈ Zp, for ρ(i) ∈M ′i , compute
C1i = R
y
ci
= {Ci = Ciy = (gaλ′ih−r
′
i
ρ(i))
y, Di = D
y
i = (g
r′i)y}
C2 = R
y
b · C1 = gτy · gw0
C3 = R
y
d = e(g, g)
α1τy
C4 =
C3 · C
e(Ra, C1)
=
M · e(g1, g2)w · e
(
(gID1 h)
w, gu
′′
0
)
e
(
gα22 (g
ID
1 h)
u′′ · gα1gat′′ , gw0
)
=
M
e(gα1gat′′ , gw0 )
ES.Decrypt(CTS , SKS): Given ciphertext CTS and private
key SKS , let I ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , `} be defined as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈
S}. Then, let {wi ∈ Zp}i∈I be a set of constants such that
if {λ′i} are valid shares of any secret τ according to M , then∑
i∈I
wiλ
′
i = τ .
The decryption algorithm uses t′ and computes
M =
C4 · e
(
C2,K · gat′
)
∏
i∈I
(
e(Ci, L · gt′) · e(Di,Kρ(i) · ht′ρ(i))
)wi · C3
=
M · e
(
gτygw0 , g
α1gat
′′
)
e(gα1gat′′ , gw0 ) ·
(∏
i∈I
e(g, g)t
′′ayλ′iwi
)
· e(g, g)α1τy
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We first prove that our ABE→IBE type ES is indistinguish-
able under selectively chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-sCPA),
if the decisional q-parallel BDHE assumption holds.
Theorem 1. Suppose the decisional q-parallel BDHE as-
sumption holds, our ABE→IBE type ES is IND-sCPA secure
with a challenge matrix of size `∗ × n∗, where `∗, n∗ ≤ q.
Proof: Suppose we have an adversary A with non-
negligible advantage against the ABE→IBE type ES. We
construct an algorithm B which can solve the decisional q-
parallel BDHE problem by using A.
Init. A chooses a target access structure A∗ and a target
identity ID∗, and sends them to B.
Setup. B Setup simulation as follows:
ABE Setup. B chooses α′ ∈R Zp and implicitly sets α =
α′ + aq+1 by letting
e(g, g)α1 = e(ga, ga
q
)e(g, g)α
′
.
For each attribute x ∈ U , B chooses a values zx ∈R Zp.
Let X denote the set of indices i, such that ρ∗(i) = x, B sets
hx = g
zx
∏
i∈X
gaM
∗
i,1/bi · ga2M∗i,2/bi · · · gan
∗
M∗i,n∗/bi .
Note that if X = Φ then sets hx = gzx . B sends the public
parameters g, e(g, g)α1 , ga, {hx}ρ∗(i)∈U to A.
IBE-Setup. B chooses z1, z2, z3 ∈R Z∗p and sets g0 = g,
g1 = g
az1 , g2 = g
aqz2 , h = g−ID
∗
1 g
z3 . B sets the master
private key MSK = az1. B sends the public parameters
g0, g1, g2, h to A.
Phase 1. A adaptively interacts with B as follows:
• ExtractA(S). A queries the ABE private key SKS
with a set S, where S 6|= A∗.
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B first finds a vector −→w = (w1, · · · , wn∗) ∈ Zp such
that w1 = −1 and for all i where ρ∗(i) ∈ S we have
that −→w ·M∗i = 0. Then B chooses r ∈R Zp.
B defines t = r+w1aq +w2aq−1 + · · ·+wn∗aq−n∗+1.
It lets
L = gr
∏
i=1,··· ,n∗
(
ga
q+1−i)wi
= gt.
B computes K = gα′gar∏i=2,··· ,n∗ (gaq+2−i)wi . For
x ∈ S and there is no i such that ρ∗(i) = x, B defines
Kx = L
zx .
For x ∈ S and let X be the set of all i such that ρ∗(i) =
x, B defines
Kx = L
zx
∏
i∈X
∏
j=(1,n∗)
g aj ·rbi ∏
k=(1,n∗)
k 6=j
(
ga
q+1+j−k/bi
)wk
M∗i,j
B returns SKS to A and records the tuple (S, SKS) in
an ABE private key List (ASKL).
• ExtractI(ID). A queries the IBE user’s private key
SKID with an identity ID.
– If ID = ID∗, B rejects.
– If ID 6= ID∗, B checks the list of REKL, and if
there exits the re-encryption key to ID and S |=
W , B rejects. Otherwise, B chooses u ∈R Zp and
computes
SK1ID = g
−aqz2z3
(ID−ID∗)
(
gaz1(ID−ID
∗)gz3
)u
,
SK2ID = g
−aqz2
(ID−ID∗) gu
B returns SKID = (SK1ID, SK2ID) to A and records
the tuple (ID, SKID) in an IBE private key list (ISKL).
• ExtractA→I(S, ID). A queries the re-encryption key
from attribute set S to identity ID as follows:
If S 6|= M∗: B runs ExtractA(S) and obtains an ABE
private key SKS = (K,L, {Kx}x∈S).
– When ID 6= ID∗, B sets the re-encryption key
RKI→A = (Ra, Rb, {Rci}ρ(i)∈M ′ , Rd, rk1, rk2})
as follows:
Select t′, u′ ∈R Zp and set
Ra = K ·gat′ ·SK2ID ·gu
′
= K ·gat′g −a
qz2
(ID−ID∗) ·gu′ .
Select τ ∈R Zp and set
Rb = g
τ ,
Rc = (g
az1(ID−ID∗)gz3)τ ,
Rd = e(g
a, ga
q
)τ .
Compute rk1 = L · gt′ and for each x ∈ S,
rkx = Kx · ht′x .
– When ID = ID∗, B chooses t′, u′′ ∈R Zp and
computes
Ra = K · gat′ · gu′′ = K · gat′ · gu′′ .
Select τ ∈R Zp and set
Rb = g
τ , Rc = g
z3τ , Rd = e(g
a, ga
q
)τ .
Compute rk1 = L · gt′ and for each x ∈ S,
rkx = Kx · ht′x .
Otherwise S |= M∗: If B already answers IBE private
key for ID, B rejects. Otherwise, does as follows:
– When ID 6= ID∗, B chooses t′′, u ∈ Zp and
computes
Ra = g
α′gatg
−aqz2
(ID−ID∗) gu.
Select τ ∈R Zp and set
Rb = g
τ ,
Rc =
(
gaz1(ID−ID
∗)gz3
)τ
,
Rd = e
(
ga, ga
q
)τ
.
Compute rk1 = gt
′′
, {rkx = ht′′x }x∈S .
Remark.
Ra = g
α′gat
′′
g
−aqz2
(ID−ID∗) gu
= gα
′+aq+1gat
′′
g
−aqz2
(ID−ID∗) gu−a
q+1
= gαgatgat
′
g
−aqz2
(ID−ID∗) gu1gu
′
= K · gat′ · SK2ID · gu
′
where t+ t′ = t′′, u = −a
qz2
(ID−ID∗) + u1, u1 + u
′ =
u− aq+1.
– When ID = ID∗, B chooses t, u ∈ Zp and
computes Ra = gα
′
gatgu.
Select τ ∈R Zp and set
Rb = (g
z3)τ , Rc = g
τ , Rd = e(g
a, ga
q
)τ .
Compute rk1 = gt and for each x ∈ S, rkx = htx.
B returns RKA→I to A and records the tuple
(S,ID,RKA→I) in re-encryption key list (REKL).
Challenge. A submits two equal length plaintexts
M0,M1 ∈ GT and chooses which scheme to attack. B flips
a coins β.
If A selects ABE scheme to attack, B builds the challenge
ciphertext CT ∗A = (C
∗, C
′∗, {C∗x, D∗x}ρ(x)∗∈M∗)
C∗ =Mβ · T · e(gs, gα′), C ′ = gs
B chooses y′2, · · · , y′n∗ and the share the secret using the
vector
−→v = (s, sa+ y′2, sa2 + y′3, · · · , san−1 + y′n∗) ∈ Zn
∗
p
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B chooses r′1, · · · , r′` ∈ Zp. For i = 1, · · · , n∗, let Ri as the
set of all k 6= i such that ρ∗(i) = ρ∗(k) meaning the same
attributes as row i.
B computes
Di = g
−r′ig−sbi
Ci = h
r′i
ρ∗(i)
 ∏
j=2,··· ,n∗
(ga)M
∗
i,jy
′
j
 (gbi·s)−zρ∗(i)
·
∏
k∈Ri
∏
j=1,··· ,n∗
(ga
j ·s·(bi/bk))M
∗
k,j

IfA selects IBE scheme to attack,B outputs an IBE challenge
ciphertext CT ∗ = (C∗1 , C
∗
2 , C
∗
3 ) corresponding to a target
identity ID∗ as follows:
C∗1 = Mβ · T, C∗2 = gs, C∗3 = gsz3
Phase 2. Same as in Phase 1.
Guess. A outputs a guess β′ ∈ {0, 1}. If β′ = β then B
outputs 1 meaning T = e(g, g)a
q+1s; otherwise, it outputs 0
to indicate T is a random group element in GT .
Theorem 2. Suppose the decisional q-parallel BDHE as-
sumption holds, the IBE→ABE type ES is IND-sCPA secure
with a challenge matrix of size `∗ × n∗, where `∗, n∗ ≤ q.
Proof: The security of IBE→ABE type ES is similar to
that of ABE→IBE type ES except the re-encryption key
queries ExtractI→A(ID, S). Therefore, we just present the
re-encryption key queries as follows.
ExtractI→A(S, ID) A queries the re-encryption key from
identity ID to attribute set S as follows:
If ID 6= ID∗: B runs ExtractI(ID) and obtains an IBE
private key SKID = (SK1ID, SK
2
ID).
• S 6|= M∗: B runs ExtractA(S) and obtains an ABE
private key SKS=(K,L, {Kx}x∈S). B uses SKID
and SKS to generate RKI→A=(Ra,Rb, {Rci}ρ(i)∈M ′ ,
Rd, rk1, rk2}).
• S |= M∗: B chooses t, t′′, u′ ∈R Zp and computes
Ra = SK
1
ID · (gaz1(ID−ID
∗)gz3)u
′ · gα′gatgat′′
Remark.
Ra = SK
1
ID·(gaz1(ID−ID
∗)gz3)u
′ ·gα′gatgat′′
= SK1ID·(gaz1(ID−ID
∗)gz3)u
′ ·gα′+aq+1gatga(t′′−aq)
= SK1ID · (gaz1(ID−ID
∗)gz3)u
′ · gα1gatga(t′′−aq)
= SK1ID · (gID1 h)u
′ ·K · gat′
B selects τ ∈R Zp and sets Rb = gτ .
Let M∗ be an ` × n matrix. The algorithm first chooses a
random vector ~v∗ = (τ, y∗2 , · · · , y∗n) ∈ Znp . These values will
be used to share the encryption exponent τ .
For i = 1 to `, it calculates λ∗i = ~v∗ ·M∗i , where M∗i is the
vector corresponding to the ith row of M∗. In addition, the
algorithm chooses random r∗i ∈ Zp and computes
Rci = {Ci = gaλ∗i h−r
∗
i
ρ(i) , Di = g
r∗i
Rd =
(
e(ga, ga
q
) · e(g, g)α′
)τ
B chooses δ ∈R Zp and computes rk1 = sk2ID · gu
′ ·
gδ, rk2 = (g
az1(ID−ID∗)gz3)δ . B returns RKI→A to A.
If ID = ID∗:
• S 6|= M∗: If B already answers ABE private key for S,
B rejects. Otherwise, does as follows:
B runs ExtractA(S) to generate K, then it chooses
t′′, u′′ ∈ Zp and computes Ra = gz3(u′′) ·K · gat′′ .
Remark.
Ra = g
z3u
′′ ·K · gat′′
= ga
q+1z1z2gz3(u+u
′) ·K · ga(t′′−aqz1z2)
= gα22 (g
ID∗
1 g
−ID∗
1 g
z3)(u+u
′) ·K · gat′
= gα22 (g
ID∗
1 h)
u(gID
∗
1 h)
u′ ·K · gat′
where t′ = t′′ − aqz1z2.
B generates {Rci}ρ(i)∈M∗ andRd as the case when S |=
M∗ and ID 6= ID∗. B chooses δ ∈ Zp and computes
rk1 = g
u′′+δ, rk2 = g
z3δ . B returns RKI→A to A.
• S |= M∗: B chooses t′′, u′′ ∈ Zp and computes Ra =
gz3(u
′′) · gα′gat · gat′′ .
Remark.
Ra = g
z3u
′′ ·gα′gat·gat′′
= ga
q+1z1z2gz3(u+u
′)·gα′+aq+1gat·ga(t′′−aqz1z2−aq)
= gα22 (g
ID∗
1 g
−ID∗
1 g
z3)(u+u
′)·K·gat′
= gα22 (g
ID∗
1 h)
u(gID
∗
1 h)
u′ ·K·gat′
where t′ = t′′ − aqz1z2 − aq .
B generates {Rci}ρ(i)∈M∗ andRd as the case when S |=
M∗ and ID 6= ID∗. B chooses δ ∈ Zp and computes
rk1 = g
u′′+δ, rk2 = g
z3δ . B returns RKI→A to A.
V. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
A. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this subsection, we present the theoretical analysis of our
construction in terms of computation, communication and
storage complexity. In the analysis, we consider the following
operations: Ep denotes the computation in bilinear pairings,
Ee denotes the exponentiation computation, |GT | is the size
of groupGT , |G1| is the size of groupG, and s is the number
of user’s attributes, respectively.
Table 2 presents the comparison of efficiency between
two approaches, one is the naive decrypt-and-Re-Encrypt
method, and the other is our ABE→IBE type ES. The naive
solution is the one that a client first downloads the encrypted
data in the format of ABE from cloud server, decrypts the
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TABLE 2. Comparison between Naive Decrypt-and-Re-Encrypt with our ABE→IBE Type ES
Naive Decrypt-and-Re-Encrypt ABE→IBE Type ES
Computation ABE.Dec+IBE.Enc: ES.ReKey (client side): Ep + (3 + s)Ee
(2 + 2s)Ep + 6Ee ES.ReEnc (cloud side): 2sEp + 3Ee
Communication (ABE.CT+IBE.CT).Size (ES.ReKey).Size (from client to cloud)
2|GT |+ (3 + 2s)|G1| |GT |+ (4 + s)|G1|
Storage ABE.CT+IBE.CT ES.ReEnc.CT:
2|GT |+ (3 + 2s)|G1| |GT |+ 2|G1|
TABLE 3. Comparison between Naive Decrypt-and-Re-Encrypt with our IBE→ABE Type ES
Naive Decrypt-and-Re-Encrypt IBE→ABE Type ES
Computation IBE.Dec+ABE.Enc: ES.ReKey (client side): Ep + (5 + 3s)Ee
3Ep + (3s+ 1)Ee ES.ReEnc (cloud side): 3Ep + 3Ee
Communication (ABE.CT+IBE.CT).Size: (ES.ReKey).Size (from client to cloud)
2|GT |+ (3 + 2s)|G1| |GT |+ (4 + 2s)|G1|
Storage IBE.CT+ABE.CT: ES.ReEnc.CT:
2|GT |+ (3 + 2s)|G1| 2|GT |+ (2 + s)|G1|
data using ABE secret key, further re-encrypts the data under
IBE format, and eventually uploads the resulting encryption
to cloud. In the computational complexity, it can be seen from
the table that the naive solution requires client to consume
linear cost in pairings, while ABE→IBE type ES only costs
an Ep on client side (note the linear complexity is off-loaded
to cloud). Although the communication complexity of the
two approaches is nearly identical, the storage cost incurred
by ABE→IBE type ES gets rid of linear requirement in |G1|.
Therefore, we can state that the new primitive designed in
this paper outperforms the naive solution. We state that the
complexity is reduced in our ES that makes sense because
the ES converts a complex encryption, ABE, into a much
simpler one, IBE. For the conversion from IBE to ABE,
however, it may be another case. From Table 3, we can see
that the complexity of the two solutions is quite close; a
few pairings are reduced in our IBE→ABE Type ES in the
communication and computation costs. Therefore, we may
state that the performance of our solution is still a bit better
than that of the naive solution w.r.t. the conversion from IBE
to ABE.
B. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
We make use of bilinear pairings e : G1 × G1 → G2
to achieve the security level of 80 bits. To simulate the
worst case, we generate ciphertext policies in the form of
(S1 and S2 ... and Sl) increasing from 10 to 100, where
Si is an attribute. We repeat each instance 20 times and
eventually take the average. The time at figures is given
in the unit of milliseconds. In the simulation, we use the
famous and widely studied cryptographic library MIRACL2.
We run the simulation on an Intel I7-4770 processor with
3.40 GHz clock frequency and 4 GB RAM running Windows
7 operating system.
2https://libraries.docs.miracl.com/miracl-user-manual/installation.
The simulation results (w.r.t. the time spent in computa-
tion) are shown in Fig 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c). In the figures, we
let “ABE-IBE" denote the ABE→IBE Type ES (in Section
III-B), “IBE-ABE" denote the IBE→ABE Type ES (in Sec-
tion III-C), “BB-IBE" is the first construction in [9], respec-
tively. The figure 1(a) shows the time spent in re-encryption
key (w.r.t. ABE-IBE and IBE-ABE) and decryption key
(w.r.t. Waters-ABE and BB-IBE) generation. IBE→ABE
Type ES requires the longest time in the key preparation
(nearly 0.52 s), while Waters-ABE and ABE→IBE Type ES
share similar time complexity (around 0.18 s). The cost of
time for BB-IBE is constant (approximately 0.01 s) because
there is only one attribute, i.e. identity, embedded into the
key. The figure 1(b) is about the complexity of re-encryption
in our ESs. It can be seen that IBE-ABE (nearly 0.4 s)
outperforms ABE-IBE (around 0.88 s). This is so because the
re-encryption in the conversion from ABE to IBE requires
the cost of pairings which is linear with the size of row
matching set I (while the re-encryption of IBE-ABE is in the
cost of constant pairings). It is worth of mentioning that the
re-encryption burden in our ESs can be off-loaded to cloud
server. The decryption complexity comparison is shown in
the figure 1(c). The cost of ABE-IBE and BB-IBE is constant
(only using constant number of pairings), nearly 0.1s, while
IBE-ABE suffers from the worst performance, 2.5 s (due
to a fact that two linear groups of pairings are required in
decryption). In general, from the simulation results shown
among the Figures, we can state that the cost incurred by our
ESs is acceptable in practice (with best performance<1 s and
the worst case 2.5 s).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have introduced encryption switching be-
tween IBE and ABE which is the first of its type in the
literature. The security notion has been defined in the game-
based framework. We have presented a concrete construction
and meanwhile proved it to be CPA secure in the standard
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model under the decisional q-parallel BDHE assumption.
The efficiency analysis has highlighted that our solution
outperforms the download-and-re-encrypt conversion mode
w.r.t. computation and communication cost. At last, the sim-
ulation results have shown that the computational complexity
in terms of re-encryption and decryption (in our construction)
are in the acceptable range, e.g., around 0.9 s and 2.5 s
for ABE→IBE re-encryption and decryption, respectively.
Some interesting open problems have been incurred from this
work as well, for example, how to shorten the re-encrypt and
decrypt time at the case of ABE→IBE, and seek an approach
to achieve simulation-based security.
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